People

深具影響力的經濟學家兼政治思想家阿爾伯特·赫希曼（Albert Hirschman）以其對經濟發展和社會變遷的理論而聞名。他的著作《退出、發聲與忠誠》（Exit, Voice, and Loyalty）深入探討了企業、組織和國家面對衰退時的反應機制。

深具影響力的經濟學家兼政治思想家阿爾伯特·赫希曼（Albert Hirschman）以其對經濟發展和社會變遷的理論而聞名。他的著作《退出、發聲與忠誠》（Exit, Voice, and Loyalty）深入探討了企業、組織和國家面對衰退時的反應機制。

二十一世紀被譽為人工智能的黃金時代。海量的創新方法、突破性發現、層出不窮的新應用使我們目不暇接。多少傳統的商業模式、社交行為、資訊的獲取方式乃至社會的方方面面都正面臨革命性的改變，其中又以醫療領域尤其值得注意。

二十一世紀被譽為人工智能的黃金時代。海量的創新方法、突破性發現、層出不窮的新應用使我們目不暇接。多少傳統的商業模式、社交行為、資訊的獲取方式乃至社會的方方面面都正面臨革命性的改變，其中又以醫療領域尤其值得注意。

This article studies career spillovers across workers, which arise in firms with limited promotion opportunities. We exploit a 2011 Italian pension reform that unexpectedly tightened eligibility criteria for the public pension, leading to sudden, substantial, and heterogeneous retirement delays. Using administrative data on Italian private-sector workers, the analysis leverages cross-firm variation to isolate the effect of retirement delays among soon-to-retire workers on the wage growth and promotions of their colleagues. We find evidence of spillover patterns consistent with older workers blocking the careers of their younger colleagues, but only in firms with limited promotion opportunities.

The scalability of a marketplace depends on the operations of the marketplace platform and its sellers’ capacities. In this study, we explore one strategy that a marketplace platform can use to enhance its scalability: providing an ancillary service to sellers. In our model, a platform can choose whether and when to provide this service to sellers and, if so, what prices to charge and which types of sellers to serve. Although such a service helps small sellers, we highlight that the provision of such a service can diminish the incentives of large sellers to make their own investment, thereby reducing their potential output. When the output reduction by large sellers is substantial, the platform may not want to provide the ancillary service, and, even if it does, it may choose to set a price higher than its marginal cost to motivate large sellers to scale. The platform may also choose to strategically delay the provision of the service.

We present a novel explanation of why organizations tend to lose their agility over time despite their efforts to foster worker initiative in adapting to local information. Worker initiative ensures efficiency but requires strong incentives. When incentives are relational and the firm faces shocks to its credibility, it may adopt standardized work processes that ignore local information but yield satisfactory (though suboptimal) performance. The adoption of such standardized processes helps the firm survive the current shock but inflicts inefficiencies in the future. Although the firm may recover, it becomes more vulnerable to future shocks, and consequently, more reliant on the standardized work procedures.

We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. We show that the proof-of-work system may lead to a situation in which some large firms in the blockchain industrial ecosystem—blockchain conglomerates—capture the governance of the blockchain.

無論是投資者或是經營者，都希望自己參與的企業在市場競爭中立於不敗之地。一間公司的內在價值，取決於其維持自由現金流的能力。能做到歷久不衰、長期獲利的企業，通常都具備可持續競爭優勢（sustainable competitive advantage），也就是畢非德（Warren Buffett）口中的「經濟護城河」（economic moat）。