Over the last decade, researchers and practitioners have become increasingly interested in how firms can leverage managerial responses (MRs) to capitalize on positive reviews and mitigate the potential harm caused by negative reviews. Intuitively, companies should respond to negative reviews (MR-N) to mitigate the damage they cause, while offering more general responses to positive reviews (MR-P). However, the proportion of MR-P on TripAdvisor has consistently increased since 2006 and has surpassed the percentage of MR-N since 2013. Two key questions remain: Given the constraints of limited resources, should managers prioritize soothing unsatisfied customers or pleasing satisfied ones? What are the effects of MRs on customer review ratings and financial outcomes?
3910 3087
KK 720
Peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing marketplaces enable sharing of idle resources. When a renter requests an owner’s resource, the owner needs to decide whether to accept the request: accepting it helps the owner fill up the idle periods of the resource and generate a payoff but reduces the flexibility to serve a future request for a longer duration. This paper develops a framework to uncover the tradeoffs faced by owners on these platforms when making acceptance decisions, which can be used by owners to optimize their decisions and by platforms to improve their operations. The model explicitly accommodates two types of owners: some are attentive to the availability states of their cars and forward-looking, whereas others myopically make the acceptance decisions. Applying the model to unique data from a leading peer-to-peer car sharing platform in China, we obtain similar sizes of both types of owners and find that female, experienced, and younger owners are more likely to be strategic. The results also reveal the differentiated preferences of the two types of owners toward their renters. Building on model estimates, we calibrate the option value of each day in the future (i.e., the value of having the day available) for strategic owners and find it to first increase, then decrease. Two counterfactual analyses are conducted. The first analysis shows that if the platform imposes a minimum rental duration, strategic owners may become more reluctant to accept requests, even if the current availability state entails a higher expected payoff. The second analysis shows that with better understanding of its owners, the platform can greatly improve the matching efficiency by optimal (re)allocation of rental requests, a move that benefits almost all participants in the business.