Short selling regulation has been a longstanding topic of debate in financial markets, particularly during times of crisis. While proponents argue that short selling aids in price discovery and market efficiency, critics raise concerns about manipulative short selling practices that can destabilize markets. This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the impact of short selling, specifically manipulative short selling (MSS), on bank runs and efficiency. The model demonstrates that MSS can emerge as an equilibrium outcome driven by uninformed speculators seeking to profit from artificially depressing stock prices. The prevalence of MSS is influenced by the level of informed trading and coordination friction among creditors. We find that short selling bans can enhance welfare by mitigating the negative effects of MSS, particularly in scenarios with high coordination frictions. We also provide policy and empirical implications.
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KK 1232
China Evergrande Group’s liquidators have launched court proceedings against PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, another legal step to recover at least a fraction of creditors’ investments from the property giant. “A collapse as large as China Evergrande severely undermines investors’ confidence in the system, and the only way to restore it is to have a transparent autopsy,” said Pingyang Gao, an accounting and law professor at the HKU Business School. He added that the liquidators’ legal actions and court proceedings will help with that process.
We study the effects of mark-to-market accounting (MTM) for banks following the originate-to-distribute lending model. Banks have expertise in originating loans, but it is costly for them to retain the loans on their books. We study how the accounting measurement of the retained loans affects the banks’ origination and retention decisions. We show that, relative to historic cost accounting (HC), MTM has three consequences. First, it improves the accuracy of loan measurement ex post. Second, it forces banks to retain more risk exposure on their own books. Finally, it can reduce ex ante origination efforts and lower the average quality of loans in the economy.