Latest Research Publications

By matching data on land transactions in China’s primary land market with detailed curricula vitae of board directors in publicly listed firms, we identify a pattern of ‘revolving-door’ exchanges between local officials and firms. The officials discounted the price of land that they sold to the said firms, and were subsequently rewarded with board appointments upon retirement. Specifically, these ‘client officials’ are three times as likely to be recruited by the ‘patron firms’ as board directors and enjoy a salary that is 23% higher, and 81% more company shares by comparison with directors who did not help firms to secure cheap land deals. All of these, however, are conditional on patron firms being able to receive a price discount, which averaged 19.4% when they purchased them in normal times. However, when client officials were constrained from providing a price discount during a surprise audit, the likelihood of client officials recruited as board directors was halved, with the price discount and extra compensation received by the patrons and clients, respectively, vanishing altogether. By providing evidence of the reciprocal benefits received by both parties, we demonstrate that the revolving door is used as a ‘payment’ rather than a ‘connection’ device in the Chinese context.

Based on textual analysis and a comparison of cybersecurity risk disclosures of firms that were hacked to others that were not, we propose a novel firm-level measure of cybersecurity risk for all U.S.-listed firms. We then examine whether cybersecurity risk is priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Portfolios of firms with high exposure to cybersecurity risk outperform other firms, on average, by up to 8.3% per year. Yet, high-exposure firms perform poorly in periods of high cybersecurity risk. Reassuringly, the measure is higher in information-technology industries, correlates with characteristics linked to firms hit by cyberattacks, and predicts future cyberattacks.

In the context of free-to-play (FTP) mobile games, this paper seeks to examine one question: Which factors affect a player's play duration or in-app purchases (of virtual items)? This research question has not been examined in the research literature. But it is an important one because the revenue of an FTP game developer is based on in-app ads watched by players (which depend on play duration) and in-app purchases. Using different regression models to analyze weekly data associated with 100,000 players' activities and expenditures of an FTP mobile game over a 3-year period, we provide three key results and their implications. First, game performance has an “inverted-U” effect. Players with exceptionally good/bad performance in 1 week tend to play for a shorter duration and make fewer purchases in the following week. This result implies that a game developer should monitor a player's performance and offer rewards to prevent players from dropping out. Second, virtual item novelty has a positive effect. Players who acquired new virtual items in 1 week tend to play for a longer duration and make more purchases in the following week. This result suggests that, to entice players to extend their play and increase their expenditure, the game developer should design customized virtual items with personalized pricing. Third, social interaction has a positive effect. Players who are “clan members” or played more with friends in 1 week tend to play for a longer duration and make more purchases in the following week. Hence, the game developer can benefit from this result by developing incentive for players to invite their friends to play together.

A growing number of people today are participating in the gig economy, working as independent contractors on short-term projects. We study the effects of competition on gig workers’ effort and creativity on a Chinese novel-writing platform. Authors produce and sell their works chapter by chapter under a revenue-sharing or pay-by-the-word contract with the platform. Exploiting a regulation that induced a massive entry of novels in the romance genre but not other genres, we find that, on average, intensified competition led authors to produce content more quickly, whereas its effect on book novelty was weak. However, revenue-sharing books responded to competition substantially more than pay-by-the-word books, particularly regarding novelty. Moreover, the effect of competition on novelty is considerably stronger for books at earlier stages of the product life cycle. Finally, the platform increased the promotion of contracted books, which disproportionately favored pay-by-the-word books. We discuss the implications of these results for creative workers, platform firms, and policy makers in the gig economy.

The prior literature on role congruity theory has revolved around demographic-based expectations, emphasizing role incongruity derived from a mismatch between prescriptive expectations of distinct roles. In this study, we depart from this traditional focus on between-role incongruity and explore an alternative source of role incongruity by examining how language can trigger the within-role incongruity of function-based expectations. Through an analysis of conference call transcripts and contracts for 7,649 deals during 2003–2018, we show that the incongruity of function-based expectations manifested through the language of the CFO leads banks to employ more debt contract covenants. This takes place because such incongruity increases banks’ perceived hazards. In addition, by investigating the moderating effects of corresponding CEO language and media sentiment, we show how the social context and sentiment toward the firm weaken this incongruity effect. We discuss the theoretical implications of our study for future research on the sources of role incongruity and the antecedents of contract design.

The prior literature on role congruity theory has revolved around demographic-based expectations, emphasizing role incongruity derived from a mismatch between prescriptive expectations of distinct roles. In this study, we depart from this traditional focus on between-role incongruity and explore an alternative source of role incongruity by examining how language can trigger the within-role incongruity of function-based expectations. Through an analysis of conference call transcripts and contracts for 7,649 deals during 2003–2018, we show that the incongruity of function-based expectations manifested through the language of the CFO leads banks to employ more debt contract covenants. This takes place because such incongruity increases banks’ perceived hazards. In addition, by investigating the moderating effects of corresponding CEO language and media sentiment, we show how the social context and sentiment toward the firm weaken this incongruity effect. We discuss the theoretical implications of our study for future research on the sources of role incongruity and the antecedents of contract design.

We examine how a firm's disclosure-audience policy affects investors' expertise acquisition and price informativeness in the market. We distinguish the investors' information advantage due to superior access from that due to superior ability to process information. We show that targeted selective disclosure to sophisticated investors may encourage greater expertise acquisition on the part of investors and lead to more informative prices than either public disclosure or untargeted selective disclosure, because the value of expertise is maximized if sophisticated investors gain exclusive information access at a relatively low cost. These results illuminate the persistence of private communications between investors and firms in the post–Regulation Fair Disclosure era and provide implications for regulators in addressing increasing concerns raised about the enforcement of Regulation Fair Disclosure.

This study examines the usefulness of analysts' book value forecasts and the economic factors driving analysts' issuance of these forecasts. Guided by the real-options-based valuation model (ROM) of Zhang (2000), we explicitly link book value forecasts to the need for such information in valuation. We first establish that analysts' book value forecasts are superior to forecasts that are mechanically imputed from analysts' own earnings forecasts and those from random walk models and are incrementally informative beyond analysts' earnings, cash flow, and dividend forecasts. We then employ the ROM to explore the distinct information embedded in book value forecasts and analysts' decisions to issue these forecasts. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (i) book value forecasts convey growth information that is significantly correlated with ex ante indicators of real options, while analysts' earnings forecasts do not display this property; and (ii) analysts issue more book value forecasts when either growth options or, to a lesser extent, abandonment options are an important part of firm value. Our study sheds light on how analysts' book value forecasts are useful and under what circumstances analysts provide such information to meet investors' needs.

We show that managers have a propensity to disproportionately report total revenues just above base-ten thresholds (e.g., 10 million, 30 million, 1 billion) and examine motives for and consequences of this behavior. Focusing on base-ten thresholds in revenues is important because, despite being unusually prevalent in revenue targets set in executive compensation contracts, analyst forecasts, and management forecasts, they have not been previously explored. We also show that pressure to beat these targets provides one explanation for the base-ten bias in reported revenues. However, these incentive effects do not offer a complete explanation because base-ten threshold-beating is observed even in the absence of these explicit targets. We further find that when firms beat a base-ten threshold for the first time, they experience increases in news coverage, institutional ownership, liquidity, and analyst following, even after controlling for whether they have beaten other common benchmarks. These results suggest that managers also beat base-ten thresholds in order to increase their firms' overall visibility. Overall, we show that a preference for base-ten numbers, which have no inherent economic meaning, has a measurable effect on the actions of market participants. These results open the door to a new range of managerial targets previously unexplored.