团队

环境和社会（ES）基金的投票行为真的与其公开声明一致吗？每年，这些基金经理会代表投资者，对旗下投资组合企业的提案进行投票。投资者期望自己投资的企业会大力支持ES倡议，然而，笔者Roni Michaely教授联同Guillem Calafi-Ordonez教授和Silvina Rubio教授最近发表的一项研究揭示，若果一些提案很大机会被通过或否决，这些基金通常会投票支持，然而，在票数相近的关键时刻，他们往往会投下反对票。

环境和社会（ES）基金的投票行为真的与其公开声明一致吗？每年，这些基金经理会代表投资者，对旗下投资组合企业的提案进行投票。投资者期望自己投资的企业会大力支持ES倡议，然而，笔者Roni Michaely教授联同Guillem Calafi-Ordonez教授和Silvina Rubio教授最近发表的一项研究揭示，若果一些提案很大机会被通过或否决，这些基金通常会投票支持，然而，在票数相近的关键时刻，他们往往会投下反对票。

WSJ talked about the current trend of corporate dictatorships, where companies are run by founder-chief executives who hold on to special voting shares or run boards as their own personal fief. The article highlights a study by Prof. Roni Michaely of the University of Hong Kong, Hyunseob Kim of the Chicago Federal Reserve, and Doron Levit of University of Washington, which found that the benefits of a benign corporate dictatorship wane over time. The research, which examined 920 companies with both voting and non-voting shares, revealed an intriguing pattern. During the initial years following an IPO, companies with founder control tended to perform on par with their more democratically governed counterparts. However, after a decade or so, a significant premium emerged for shares with full voting rights. The article argues that granting full voting rights to all stakeholders is still the best form of governance for companies in the long run.

Prof Michaely presented a paper utilizing a unique dataset comprising nearly one million voting rationales provided by investors. The research findings shed light on the motivations behind institutional investors’ voting decisions and their impact on corporate governance practices.

There’s little evidence that the benefits to mankind make up for lower returns on your investment.

「被港大管理层委以重任，在我的家乡成立一所创业及创科中心，对我来说，是一趟非常刺激的旅程。我很期待与港大优秀的学者合作、尽早展开我的教学工作、并与香港和中国内地的商界精英交流。我相信在以色成立港大创新中心，将会为所有持分者带来莫大的裨益。我非常高兴能够参与其中。」

港大经管学院教授（金融学）Roni Michaely及另外几位教授共同参与的一项研究显示，指数基金未能有效监察旗下企业，引致投资者与公司管理层权力失衡。