2859 1049
KK 923
Dr. Alan P. Kwan is an academic currently serving as an Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Hong Kong. He also serves as program director for the Master’s of Finance in Financial Technology.
Dr. Kwan’s interest in finance was influenced by years working in the financial industry, including roles at a major global macro hedge fund and a quantitative trading firm specializing in energy markets. His research focuses on two main themes: regulatory economics, and the economics of intangible capital. In regulatory economics, he aims to understand the implications of regulatory events and laws on financial market participants. His work on intangible capital aims to understand how a firm’s knowledge, technology, and information acquisition create value. To study these, he uses big data and machine learning techniques in collaboration with corporate partners with vast datasets.
He has published a variety of papers in outlets including American Economic Review, Management Science, Science Advances, Journal of Financial Economics, and the Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis. He has also presented his research at top selective conferences in his field, including the Western Finance Association, American Finance Association and National Bureau of Economic Research, winning several best prize awards.
強積金是香港的強制性公積金計劃，旨在為居民提供基本的退休保障。在過去25年裡，強積金對香港普惠金融的發展起了重要的推動作用，成功鼓勵了家庭參與證券市場。然而，其年化回報率偏低的問题一直備受批評。隨著積金易平台即將推出，不同強積金計劃將可以整合到統一數碼制度中，這正好提供一個有利的契機，以對香港的主要退休儲蓄制度作出重大改進。 關穎倫教授、Thomas Maurer教授及太明珠教授分析了導致強積金表現欠佳的三個主要原因：資產配置過於保守，限制了收益潜力；部分強積金產品質量不高，管理或投資策略存在缺陷；以及高昂的費用，直接侵蝕了投資者的回報。針對這些問題，他們向政府提出了以下建議：首先，政府可以修訂預設投資策略以進一步降低費率，同時積金局亦可以邀請收費較低的新服務供應商進入市場。其次，政府應積極監察資產配置，透過採取規定性措施、推廣理財教育及篩選強積金資訊，協助市場參與者了解強積金複雜的投資產品空間。第三，政府可以開拓強積金的產品空間，引入更多元化的投資選擇。最後，積金局應提高數據透明度，並善用其數據資源進行分析。
Innovative firms must trade off disclosing to investors and maintaining secrecy from competitors. We study this trade-off in a sample of IP licenses mandatorily disclosed by US public firms, whose contents can be temporarily redacted. Hand classifying the redacted information, we find that firms with valuable IP in competitive markets redact IP information more often. Markets react positively to the redaction of IP information, consistent with theoretical predictions rationalizing a separating equilibrium in which nondisclosure signals more valuable IP. Our results suggest that credible nondisclosure partially resolves information frictions for innovative public firms when facilitated by sophisticated investors.
基於種種社會經濟問題，香港有數十萬勞動人口及其家庭已經移居海外。與此同時，受香港政府積極進取的人才計劃所吸引，過去一年也有數十萬人從外地來港。人口流動對香港的勞動力和人才庫有何影響？關穎倫博士、鄧希煒教授和王柏林博士通過分析領英（LinkedIn）社交資料和政府統計數據評估香港的勞動力市場和經濟前景。
The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over “midsize” investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions.
