團隊

團隊研究公司的信息披露政策如何影響投資者從市場中獲取專業知識，以及市場價格的信息含量。我們區分投資者的兩種不同信息優勢：從優越的渠道而獲得的信息優勢或因擁有卓越的信息處理能力而享有的信息優勢。我們發現，與公開披露或非針對性選擇性信息披露相比，針對向經驗豐富的投資者的選擇性信息披露能鼓勵投資者獲取更多專業知識，並提高價格的信息含量；當中，如經驗豐富的機構投資者能以較低成本獲得獨家信息，便能實現專業知識價值最優使用。研究結果解釋了爲何美國證監會在通過《公平揭露規則》後，投資者與公司之間的非公開信息交流仍然存在，為監管機構釋除公眾對《公平揭露規則》日益增加的疑慮及執法安排提供啟示。

We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder’s information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner’s curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival’s participation. In turn, an endogenous dis- closure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price—breaking down the standard unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders’ payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare but increasing shareholders’ payoff. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure.