環境和社會(ES)基金的投票行為真的與其公開聲明一致嗎?每年,這些基金經理會代表投資者,對旗下投資組合企業的提案進行投票。投資者期望自己投資的企業會大力支持ES倡議,然而,筆者Roni Michaely教授聯同Guillem Calafi-Ordonez教授和Silvina Rubio教授最近發表的一項研究揭示,若果一些提案很大機會被通過或否決,這些基金通常會投票支持,然而,在票數相近的關鍵時刻,他們往往會投下反對票。
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環境和社會(ES)基金的投票行為真的與其公開聲明一致嗎?每年,這些基金經理會代表投資者,對旗下投資組合企業的提案進行投票。投資者期望自己投資的企業會大力支持ES倡議,然而,筆者Roni Michaely教授聯同Guillem Calafi-Ordonez教授和Silvina Rubio教授最近發表的一項研究揭示,若果一些提案很大機會被通過或否決,這些基金通常會投票支持,然而,在票數相近的關鍵時刻,他們往往會投下反對票。
WSJ talked about the current trend of corporate dictatorships, where companies are run by founder-chief executives who hold on to special voting shares or run boards as their own personal fief. The article highlights a study by Prof. Roni Michaely of the University of Hong Kong, Hyunseob Kim of the Chicago Federal Reserve, and Doron Levit of University of Washington, which found that the benefits of a benign corporate dictatorship wane over time. The research, which examined 920 companies with both voting and non-voting shares, revealed an intriguing pattern. During the initial years following an IPO, companies with founder control tended to perform on par with their more democratically governed counterparts. However, after a decade or so, a significant premium emerged for shares with full voting rights. The article argues that granting full voting rights to all stakeholders is still the best form of governance for companies in the long run.
Prof Michaely presented a paper utilizing a unique dataset comprising nearly one million voting rationales provided by investors. The research findings shed light on the motivations behind institutional investors’ voting decisions and their impact on corporate governance practices.
There’s little evidence that the benefits to mankind make up for lower returns on your investment.
「被港大管理層委以重任,在我的家鄉成立一所創業及創科中心,對我來說,是一趟非常刺激的旅程。我很期待與港大優秀的學者合作、盡早展開我的教學工作、並與香港和中國內地的商界精英交流。我相信在以色成立港大創新中心,將會為所有持分者帶來莫大的裨益。我非常高興能夠參與其中。」
港大經管學院教授(金融學)Roni Michaely及另外幾位教授共同參與的一項研究顯示指數基金未能有效監察旗下企業,引致投資者與公司管理層權力失衡。